research on judgments of relatedness represents a new approach to this area and thus provides a valuable contribution. Instead of varying only the degree of relation between variables and studying the psychophysical function for judged relatedness, these authors have varied three components of Pearson's correlation and have studied Figure 1 shows the Pearson correlation values, assuming that subjects "misperceive" the low error variance to be 600 rather than 1,000 but maintaining the assumption that the variables are combined by a psychological process that is isomorphic to Pearson's equation. Notice that in the center panel the three points surrounded by squares no longer have the same r value, and analogously for the three points surrounded by circles. Thus, unless the psychophysical function for the manipulated variables is the identity function, the nonequivalence of the judgments for the key stimuli in Figure 1 does not tell us whether Pearson's equation is viable model of covariation judgment.
The bottom panel of Figure 1 presents the values off 2 for the same stimulus combinations that are presented in the center panel of the figure. This monotonic transformation of the ordinate is analogous to the possibility that ratings of covariation are not a linear function of the subject's impression of covariation.
In the bottom panel, when the slope is equal to 2, the data show an interaction of vJT-variance and error variance, whereas in the center panel there is no interaction for a slope of 2. Thus, unless it is assumed that the response scale is used linearly, the X-Vari- (Birnbaum, 1982a; Krantz & Tversky, 1971) . The difficulty in testing models of human judgment is reflected in the fact that the field of psychophysics has a long history of debate over the interpretation of rating scale responses (Attneave, 1962; Birnbaum, 1982b; Krantz, 1974; Marks, 1974; Torgerson, 1961) . out considering the problems of psychological scaling of the manipulated variables and response scale nonlinearity, it is not possible to articulate and test theories of the functional relation between cues and covariation judgment. These issues are important regardless of whether the stimulus dimensions are perceived integrally or separably.
Relative Importance of Cues Lane et al. concluded that error variance had a larger influence on judged relatedness than did either ^-variance or slope. The evidence presented for this conclusion was a set of NewmanKeuls comparisons showing that objectively equal stimulus changes do not produce equal changes in judged covariation. These conclusions regarding the relative importance of cues also depend on assuming the psychophysical function to be the identity function. The authors' particular findings can be predicted by proposing that the low error variance stimulus is perceived to be lower than its objective value, whereas the values of the other variables are perceived to be close to their objective values.
A more serious issue is the meaning of the term importance when applied to the effect of a stimulus variable in psychology.
Measures of importance such as the proportion of variance accounted for, effect size, and omega squared depend critically on what other variables are present in the experiment and the degree to which each variable in the experiment is manipulated. A variable that is manipulated over a wider psychological range will have a larger effect than a variable manipulated over a narrower subjective range. To draw a general conclusion that one variable is more important in judgment than others, much more is required than a demonstration that stimulus changes that are objectively equal do not have equivalent effects on judgment. The definitions of the psychological importance of variables that are implicit in different theoretical approaches to human judgment have been articulated by Hammond, McClelland, and Mumpower (1980, pp. 213-218) and by Shanteau (1980) . For some approaches, psychological importance is represented in part in scaling constants, whereas for other approaches psychological importance is represented in weights that are theoretically independent of scale value. Although there is no method for measuring the psychological importance of variables that is generally agreed upon by researchers of human judgment, Lane et al. have not attempted to use any of the extant approaches and have not articulated their own approach to the measurement of the psychological importance of variables in judgment.
